Poisoned Optimizely scripts on BBC, CNN and Zoom swapped crypto wallets, skimmed cards and targeted iPhones
On November 16, malicious code rode Optimizely's experiment scripts onto 178 organisations' sites for most of a day. What it did, what's confirmed, and what to check.
On November 16, 2026, attackers slipped malicious code into scripts served by Optimizely, a widely used website-testing service, and for most of the day it ran on the sites of its customers — including the BBC, CNN, Zoom, Salesforce, GitLab, Fox News and Air France-KLM. Report URI, a firm that monitors website scripts, found the code in 188 Optimizely scripts belonging to 178 organisations, and says the true number is likely higher. The code swapped cryptocurrency wallet addresses, captured card details typed into forms, and tried to load known exploit kits on older iPhones. It was largely cleaned up by that evening.
What happened, in plain English
Big websites rarely run only their own code. They load small scripts from outside companies for analytics, ads, cookie banners and A/B testing — showing visitors two versions of a page to see which works better. Optimizely is one of the largest A/B testing services, and its customers add one line to their pages that loads a script from Optimizely's servers on every visit.
That arrangement means whoever controls the script controls the page. On November 16, someone did. According to The Hacker News, which cites Report URI, the first injection appeared in the BBC's Optimizely script at 04:21 UTC. Each poisoned script had one extra line that loaded a file called track.js from an attacker server, 1688360[.]cc. Optimizely's incident notice, quoted by The Hacker News, says the attacker "exploited a vulnerability in Experimentation" to add the code to some customer projects; it has not said publicly how the flaw worked.
The same group had been at it for days. The Hacker News reports that its injector reached visitors through three smaller vendors' scripts — Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute Media — from late the previous week, before it reached Optimizely.
Think of it as tampering with the shop's till rather than robbing the shop: every customer who pays gets served normally, and the money goes somewhere else.
Are you affected? What to do now
If you visited one of these sites on November 16:
- Crypto: if you copied or pasted a wallet address on an affected site that day, check where the funds actually went. The code replaced addresses for Bitcoin, Ethereum, Tron, TON, Solana, Litecoin, Bitcoin Cash and Dogecoin, and only when they appeared near words like "wallet," "deposit" or "send." Going forward, confirm addresses on a hardware wallet's own screen.
- Cards: the skimmer was added at 13:43 UTC and captured card number, expiry date and CVV from forms on the page. It could not read card fields inside a payment provider's separate frame (Stripe, Adyen and similar). If you paid on an affected site that afternoon or evening by typing the card into the page itself, watch your statements or ask your bank to reissue the card.
- iPhone or iPad: the code tried to load the Coruna exploit kit (iOS 13.0–17.2.1) and DarkSword (iOS 18.4–18.7) on older devices. Update to the current iOS. If a device on an older version visited affected sites that day and holds sensitive data, consider a professional check, and turn on Lockdown Mode if you're a likely target.
If you run a website that uses Optimizely or other third-party scripts:
- Fetch your Optimizely snippet (
cdn.optimizely.com/js/<project ID>.js) and search it for1688360,.icuandtrack.js. Record theLast-Modifiedheader. - Block
1688360[.]ccand the attacker's.icudomains (listed in StepSecurity's IOC table) and search logs and Content Security Policy (CSP) reports back to November 16. - If you also load Kissmetrics, StorifyMe or Minute Media scripts, check those as well; the earlier wave ran through them and served the injector from
webshell[.]lol. - Take third-party tags off checkout and login pages entirely, and collect card details only in a payment provider's hosted fields.
- Use a CSP with explicit host allowlists for
script-srcandconnect-src. StepSecurity warns that a nonce withstrict-dynamicwould not have stopped this chain, because the trusted script was the one that loaded the malicious one. - Customers whose card numbers may have been taken on your pages may need to be notified; check your obligations under card-scheme rules and data-protection law.
The expert view
This is a textbook web supply-chain compromise — the "Magecart" pattern — but with a vendor whose reach is unusual. A/B testing scripts are, by design, allowed to change any part of the page, they load early, and they are usually exempted from the scrutiny applied to code a company writes itself. Compromising one host gives an attacker a script that is already trusted on thousands of high-value pages.
The payload was competent and narrowly targeted. Per StepSecurity's analysis, the clipper replaced only addresses that passed each blockchain's checksum and appeared in a payment context, and hooked page text, forms, the clipboard, the share sheet and outgoing requests. After a swap it sent a screenshot and up to 8,000 characters of cookies back to the attacker; HttpOnly cookies, which protect most login sessions, were out of reach. The skimmer only took cards that passed the Luhn check, and collected no names or billing addresses. The iOS branch is the part to treat with most caution: StepSecurity did not retrieve the exploit files, and Cynet, which traced the loader, described its findings as "not a successful compromise of a physical iPhone or iPad." The infrastructure was ready to deliver known kits to old devices; whether any device was actually compromised is not established.
The money is small so far. Report URI counted about $7,040 arriving in the attacker's wallets within roughly nine hours; StepSecurity puts it at about $6,600. Both caution that blockchain records can't show which transfers came from victims — two addresses were in use before the attack began. Stolen card numbers and any iOS access don't show on a blockchain at all, so the real take is unknown.
Three things remain open. Optimizely has not explained the vulnerability, nor whether it is fixed for all customers or how long it was exploitable. The count differs between sources — Report URI's 178 organisations, other reports' 186 sites — because nobody has published a full list. And the earlier wave through three smaller vendors has had no public response from those companies. For site owners, the lesson is the uncomfortable one: a third-party script tag is a standing grant of full control over your page to someone else's security.
Official sources
- OPTIMJACK: Optimizely-Hosted Scripts Loaded a Crypto Clipper and Card Skimmer — StepSecurity, November 16–17, 2026 (payload analysis, timeline, IOCs, wallet totals)
- Optimizely incident notice, published 01:02 UTC on November 17, 2026 — quoted via The Hacker News; we could not locate the original notice on Optimizely's site.
Coverage: The Hacker News (Report URI's counts and timeline, Optimizely statement, Cynet findings, earlier vendor wave); Cyber Kendra (Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute Media wave).