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Vulnerabilities6 min read

Fake "MCP doctor" npm tool for AI assistants drops a password stealer on Windows, Knostic finds

The npm package @guicai777/mcp-doctor 1.0.1 prints a real MCP config report, then silently installs StealC v2 on Windows. Check lockfiles and logs, and treat machines that ran it as compromised.

An npm package called @guicai777/mcp-doctor, sold as a helper that checks the configuration of MCP servers used by AI assistants, installs a Windows password-stealing program in the background, security firm Knostic reported on November 20, 2026. Anyone who ran version 1.0.1 on Windows should treat that machine as compromised and reset browser sessions and saved passwords from a clean device; macOS and Linux users did not receive the payload, according to the researchers.

What happened, in plain English

MCP (Model Context Protocol) is a standard way to connect AI assistants such as Claude Desktop, Cursor or VS Code agents to outside tools: a database, a file system, a ticketing system. Each connection is a small "MCP server" described in a config file, and those files are easy to get wrong. That makes "doctor" utilities, which read your config and tell you what is broken, genuinely useful.

npm is the public package registry for JavaScript. Developers often run small tools from it in one line with npx, which downloads and executes the package on the spot. That convenience is the weak point here.

According to Knostic's analysis, @guicai777/mcp-doctor does print a real diagnostic report, so it looks like it works. On Windows, however, it also unpacks a hidden program, mcp-bridge.exe, and launches it out of sight. Knostic assesses "with high confidence" that this program belongs to the StealC v2 family, an infostealer: malware built to collect browser passwords, cookies, autofill and saved payment card data, Discord tokens and similar account tokens, and send them to the attacker.

Think of a mechanic who really does check your tyre pressure — and copies your house keys while you watch the gauge. The visible service is real, which is exactly why nobody looks for the second job.

Knostic says it did not see the malware run on a real victim's machine or see stolen data arrive, and that the number of affected users is unknown. npm's download API showed 242 downloads of version 1.0.1 in the week up to November 20, a figure that includes automated downloads.

Are you affected? What to do now

Most readers have nothing to do. You only need to act if you, your developers or your build systems ran this specific package.

Who is affected

  • Anyone who installed or ran @guicai777/mcp-doctor (Knostic analysed version 1.0.1), most likely via npx.
  • Windows machines are the ones that received the stealer. On macOS and Linux, Knostic says the tool made its network check, printed its report and exited without writing or launching the Windows payload.
  • CI runners on Windows that executed it are in scope too.

How to check

  • Search package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, yarn.lock, npm caches and CI logs for @guicai777/mcp-doctor.
  • On Windows, look for mcp-bridge.exe inside a mcp-doctor folder under the user's local app data directory.
  • Search proxy, DNS and endpoint logs for the indicators Knostic published: the domain fix-mcp-bridge[.]com (including requests to /v.json) and the IP address 48.103.145[.]143. A request to /v.json shows the tool ran on some platform, not necessarily that the stealer did.
  • Knostic also published SHA-256 hashes; for mcp-bridge.exe it lists c0e6d8ad366d2998f6576911abeb9a8e5d5b203ec0d22f752702c4a622d2ebe5. The full list is in the Knostic post.

What to do, in order (if the payload ran on Windows)

  1. Isolate the machine and treat it as compromised, as Knostic advises.
  2. From a different, clean device, sign out of all browser sessions and Discord, and change passwords that were saved in the browser. Session cookies can let an attacker in without a password, so signing out everywhere matters as much as the password change.
  3. Watch saved payment cards for unexpected charges.
  4. Our recommendation: rotate any API keys, cloud tokens or AI provider keys that were reachable from that machine, and reimage it rather than trying to clean it.
  5. Going forward, read what a helper's bin entry does before running it with npx -y, as Knostic suggests, and prefer tools from known publishers.

Knostic reported the package to npm Security on November 20, 2026, and says npm acknowledged the report. Whether the package has since been removed is not confirmed in the sources we read.

A related reminder: on November 17, GitHub published advisory GHSA-q37r-5xxr-6v4x flagging versions 0.2.3, 0.2.4 and 0.2.5 of another npm package, vamp-mcp, as malware. The advisory states that "any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised" and that secrets should be rotated from a different computer. There is no evidence in either source that the two packages are linked.

The expert view

Root cause. There is no software bug here. This is a trust problem in the package ecosystem: a publisher-controlled package runs with the full privileges of the developer who executes it. npx -y removes even the install prompt, so the code runs seconds after someone copies a command from a README — Knostic notes the package's README recommends exactly that pattern with @latest, which also means a future version would run automatically.

The chain, conceptually. Knostic describes three design choices that make the package hard to spot. First, it delivers real value, so the user sees expected output. Second, it fetches a remote configuration on every run that can switch the payload off, giving the operator a kill switch and a way to stay quiet under scrutiny. Third, the Windows executable is shipped encoded inside the package rather than downloaded later, so a network-focused review of install behaviour would miss it. The payload also refuses to run on systems using Russian, Ukrainian, Belarusian, Kazakh or Uzbek languages and stops after a built-in end date of December 15, 2026 — traits common in commodity stealer operations. Knostic says the exact build and operator are unknown, and it does not attribute the package to any group.

Why MCP tooling is an attractive lure. The people who configure MCP servers are disproportionately developers and power users of AI tools, whose browsers hold sessions for cloud consoles, code hosting and AI providers. MCP config files themselves often contain API keys. A stealer on that profile of machine is worth more than one on an average laptop, and the MCP ecosystem is young enough that "which helper is the official one" is often unclear. This fits a pattern we have covered repeatedly in November: the hijacked Microsoft agent-framework release on PyPI and malicious models on Hugging Face both targeted the tooling around AI rather than the models.

Severity in context. No CVE or CVSS score applies; this is malware, not a flaw. Measured reach is small — 242 weekly downloads, some automated, no confirmed victims. For an individual machine that ran it on Windows, though, the impact is total credential exposure. We would rate it low priority for most organisations and urgent for any team that finds it in a lockfile.

What is still unknown. How many times the tool actually ran, whether any data was stolen, how the package was promoted, whether other versions or sibling packages exist, and whether npm has removed it. Organisations that allow developers to run arbitrary npx commands should treat this as a prompt to review that policy, for example by routing installs through an internal registry or proxy with malware scanning.

Official sources

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